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Abstract 
Although fibre-deployment of next generation access (NGA) broadband networks is considered as a 
decisive development for any information-based society, investment activities and especially the 
adoption of fiber-based broadband services take place only very gradually in most countries. This 
work identifies the most important determinants of NGA broadband adoption, using most recent panel 
data from the European Union member states (EU27) for the years from 2004 to 2012.  
The results show that stricter previous broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA 
adoption, while competitive pressure from mobile networks affects NGA adoption in a non-linear 
manner. It appears that the approach of strict cost-based access regulation embedded in the EU 
regulatory framework is at odds with the ambitious targets outlined in the European Commission´s 
“Digital Agenda”. Finally, we find strong evidence for network effects underlying the NGA adoption 
process. 
[1] 
1 Introduction 
The traditional (“first generation” copper or coax-based) broadband networks appear to be outdated 
and it has become necessary to speed up these networks in recent years to account for the growing 
demand for bandwidth and connection speed. According to “Nielsen´s law“, broadband connection 
speed increases every year by 50% (FTTH Council Europe, 2012, p. 12). Next generation fiber-based 
access (NGA) networks deployed in the ground provide almost unlimited bandwidth capacity at the 
highest possible speed. As these networks also represent a general purpose technology they are 
expected to induce significant productivity improvements and growth across major economic sectors 
such as health, electricity or transport (e.g. Czernich et al, 2011).
 
However, substituting the traditional 
infrastructure by fiber optic networks also involves massive investment volumes.
1
  
Demand in terms of adoption (penetration) and supply-side activities in terms of investment in fibre-
based network infrastructure (coverage) vary significantly in international comparison. Most European 
countries are lagging far behind leading Asian fiber nations (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan or 
Hongkong), but also behind the development in the US (Briglauer and Gugler, 2012). As regards NGA 
adoption within Europe, Northern and Eastern European economies are leading by a large margin with 
NGA household adoption levels between ~10% (Denmark and Latvia) and ~26% (Lithuania) at the 
end of 2011. Exceptional cases are Belgium and Luxembourg where focus on less expensive NGA 
deployment technologies facilitated adoption levels of ~45% and ~85%, respectively. However, most 
of the other European countries still show NGA adoption levels (far) below 5%, including all major 
Western and Southern European economies.
2
  
Europe´s gap in NGA deployment was recognized by the European Commission (EC) and explicitly 
addressed in its “Digital Agenda”, which specifies quite ambitious goals in terms of high-speed 
broadband coverage and penetration.
3
 In achieving these goals one of the most controversial 
regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether emerging NGA infrastructure should be 
subjected to sector-specific ex ante access regulation. Former – mostly state-owned – 
telecommunications monopolists (“incumbents”) argue that sector-specific ex ante regulation restricts 
their ability to generate future revenues. Accordingly, fibre roll-out could only, if at all, be done on the 
                                                     
1
 Total investments for a nationwide NGA deployment (coverage) depend inter alia on the network topology 
employed and the targeted coverage levels and add up to billions of euros (wik consult, 2008).  
2
  See Figure A.1 in the Annex which reports time series plots for high and low cost NGA deployment 
scenarios for the EU27 countries. 
3
  The Digital Agenda “seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections 
above 100 Mbps” (European Commission, 2010a, p. 19). Whereas the target in (i) refers to a coverage level 
of 100%, the target in (ii) is related to a minimum household adoption level subject to quality characteristics 
that can be realized with NGA technolgies only.  
[2] 
basis of deregulation of relevant markets; at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations 
(“regulatory holidays”) is deemed to be essential. Regulation of network access would, in turn, be 
detrimental to dynamic efficiency in terms of investment incentives and infrastructure innovation. 
Instead, it would be sufficient to rely on market mechanisms and infrastructure-based competition in 
particular. Conversely, alternative operators who are dependent on access regulation (“service-based 
entrants”) as well as some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) fear the rise of NGA networks as 
another upcoming monopolistic infrastructure, if regulation is released or removed entirely. They 
argue that incumbent firms or other alternative NGA infrastructure operators would gain an essential 
and long-lasting competitive (“first-mover”) advantage, which implies the need to have appropriate ex 
ante regulation in place. Regulatory-induced service-based competition would also have an immediate 
effect on static efficiency in terms of lower prices and hence on adoption of (new) communications 
technologies on the demand side. 
Based on an unbalanced panel of the EU27 member states during the period of 2004 to 2012, this 
paper addresses the following research questions: (i) What is the impact of broadband access 
regulations on NGA adoption? (ii) How does infrastructure-based competition stemming from wireless 
(mobile) networks influence the extent of NGA adoption? Finally, (iii) the paper examines the role of 
network effects which might lead to an endogenous adoption process. This paper represents the first 
European-based attempt to quantify the determinants of NGA adoption with most recent country-level 
data. Multiplicity of methods as well as a broad set of control variables serve as important robustness 
checks. Furthermore, we argue that there is no endogeneity problem in terms of reverse causality in 
our empirical specification, as we assess the impact of demand and supply-side determinants that are 
related to first generation broadband services on second generation NGA markets and services.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, we review the related empirical literature in 
section 2. Section 3 briefly provides necessary background information on the technical context of 
NGA networks. Section 4 then describes basic hypotheses concerning the role of sector-specific 
regulation and competition as well as other main cost and demand factors. Section 5 describes our 
dataset. Section 6 presents the empirical specification and most relevant econometric issues. Section 7 
discusses the main empirical results. Section 8 summarises and contains some final remarks.  
2 Literature review 
Empirical literature related to the impact of broadband access regulations and competition can be 
divided into three broad categories: (i) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on investment (ii) 
quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on adoption (penetration) and (iii) qualitative analysis 
with focus on penetration or investment. The latter appears to be most meritorious in case of too few 
observations where quantitative analysis cannot provide reliable guidance. However, we think that 
availability of NGA related data is sufficient now to allow robust statistical analysis. Accordingly, in 
[3] 
this section we focus on quantitative studies only and do not review the literature related to qualitative 
studies.
4
 In reviewing the quantitative literature one has to be aware of the heavily interest-driven 
nature of the discussion and that a large number of contributions represent directly industry-sponsored 
work. This seems to be especially relevant for econometrics work due to its high sensitivity to the 
methodological specifications and “the opacity of its techniques to the vast majority of policy makers” 
(Berkman Center, 2010, p. 96). Therefore, our literature review also excludes industry-sponsored work 
which has not been published in peer-reviewed academic journals.  
Regarding the impact of regulation on investment ((i)) Jung et al. (2008), who use US data for the 
years from 1997 to 2002, find that infrastructure competition increases investment incentives while 
mandatory access obligations at best, have a weak effect on investment of infrastructure operators. 
Recent work with data from EU countries exhibits similar results: Grajek and Röller (2011) investigate 
the relationship between regulation and total investment in the telecommunications industry. Their 
study is among the few which explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of regulation and 
investment. Investment is quantified therein rather broadly by the tangible fixed assets of 
telecommunications operators and, thus, does not explicitly refer to broadband or NGA deployment. 
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) are the first to estimate the effects of broadband access regulation on 
NGA deployment. They find that countries where broadband access regulation is more effective 
experience lower fiber deployment. However, they use data for the years from 2002 to 2007, which 
only covers the NGA roll-out at the very early stage and the authors do not capture the investment 
dynamics. Briglauer et al. (2013) investigate the determinants of NGA investment with a direct 
measure of real NGA investment for yearly data from 2005 to 2011. They find that stricter previous 
broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure 
from cable and mobile networks affects NGA deployment in a non-linear manner.  
Regarding the literature on the impact of regulation on adoption ((ii)) there are several contributions 
related to broadband markets, but actually no NGA related studies: Using US data from 2001 to 2004, 
Denni and Gruber (2007) find that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on 
broadband diffusion in the longer term, whereas regulatory-induced service-based competition has a 
positive impact only if the number of service-based entrants is not too large. Non-US based work 
mainly refers to OECD country level data: Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of 
broadband penetration for the years from 2003 to 2008. They find that infrastructure-based (inter-
platform) competition has a positive impact on broadband penetration, whereas service-based (intra-
platform) competition is an impediment to penetration. Lee et al. (2011) analyze determinants of 
broadband diffusion for the years from 2000 to 2008. With respect to unbundling obligations, the 
authors find a positive and significant effect on the speed of diffusion. They admit, however, that 
                                                     
4
  A comprehensive overview on qualitative studies can be found in Berkman Center (2010, pp. 121-136). Our 
review also excludes a number of recent quantitative studies where data are based on surveys (e.g. Sunada et 
al., 2011) and which do not consider inter alia the role of regulation and competition. 
[4] 
unbundling might have a negative impact on long-term investment and the broadband saturation level. 
Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) find that inter-platform competition has a significant and 
positive impact on broadband penetration whereas unbundling has no significant effect for data from 
2000 to 2002. Finally, some contributions refer to data from European countries: Distaso et al. (2006) 
analyze EU related data from 2001 to 2004 and find that inter-platform competition is the main driver 
of broadband take-up and has a more important role for penetration than service-based competition, 
especially in the longer term. Höffler (2007) examines data for sixteen Western European countries for 
the years from 2000 to 2004. He concludes that broadband deployment was predominantly triggered 
by infrastructure-based competition with service-based competition playing a secondary role.  
Summarizing, the majority of the empirical literature suggests that infrastructure-based (inter-
platform) competition has a positive impact on both investment and penetration. In turn, the evidence 
on service-based competition relying on broadband access regulations tends to be negatively related 
with investment activities, while the impact on broadband adoption seems to be less clear. To the best 
of the author´s knowledge there is no empirical work that employs a direct measure of NGA adoption 
and examines the causal impact of regulation and competition. This paper intends to fill this gap. 
3 Relevant NGA scenarios 
Historically, first generation legacy networks
5
 deployed twisted copper-wire pairs to overcome the last 
mile (“local loop”) to the subscriber in order to provide narrow bandwidth voice telephony services 
(POTS/ISDN) only. Many decades later, they were made capable of supporting broadband services by 
means of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) transmission technology. However, due to technical reasons, 
bandwidth of DSL technologies is limited. In order to realise NGA characteristic bandwidth, it is 
necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by placing the DSL transmission 
equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the cabinets which house distribution frames 
(“fibre to the cabinet” - FTTC). In the remaining copper-wire line of the last mile the latest DSL 
transmission technology is used. This solution can provide bandwidths of 20 Mbit/s to 100 Mbit/s. In 
addition to upgrading first generation copper-wire (DSL) networks in the local loop, the roll-out of 
high-speed communications networks might also be realised by upgrading cable (coax) television 
networks which is referred to as Fibre-to-the-last-amplifer. The latest cable transmission technology 
already allowed for bandwidths up to 150 Mbit/s.  
Similar or even higher bandwidths (above 100/150 Mbit/s) can be achieved if optical fibre is extended 
to or into the building (“fibre to the building” - FTTB). Only the remaining wiring inside the building 
relies on conventional copper-wires. If the optical line is directly connected to the individual home 
                                                     
5
 This term refers to networks already in existence and historically owned exclusively by incumbent operators.  
[5] 
(“fibre to the home” - FTTH), this would be the most future-proof technological solution, as it enables 
a large number of future services with nearly unlimited bandwidth (RTR, 2010, pp. 189-191).
6
  
FTTx stands for a family of technologies that include all the NGA scenarios described above. As such 
it differs from a more narrow definition that refers to cost intensive FTTH/B technologies only where 
fiber infrastructure terminates inside or no more than two meters away from the consumers’ building, 
either to the basement, the house or the apartment.
7
  
During the relevant period of our analysis (2004 to 2012) mobile broadband access has already been 
facilitated by 3G+ technologies such as GPRS, EDGE, UMTS und HSDPA. Moreover, the industry 
expects Long Term Evolution (LTE) to enable transmission rates similar to wireline NGA (FTTx) 
scenarios in the near future. Currently, however, LTE is still in the test phase and the before-mentioned 
mobile broadband standards are far from achieving FTTx specific bandwidth levels. Therefore, mobile 
broadband is not considered as a relevant (second generation) NGA technology in this analysis. 
4 Hypotheses 
From the empirical literature one can infer that there is a common understanding that both, demand-
side and supply-side factors have an influence on the adoption of fibre-based broadband services. 
Although the drivers of demand differ from supply drivers, most studies implicitly refer to a direct and 
positive relationship between investment (coverage) and adoption (penetration). Clearly, network 
coverage is a pre-condition for successful adoption of NGA services and therefore the higher the 
available infrastructure stock, the higher the potential subscriber base (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Wallsten 
and Hausladen, 2009).
8
 This section identifies determinants of NGA investment and adoption and sets 
out corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned to the underlying research questions. Section 4.1 and 
4.2 focus on regulation and competition as main explanatory variables which directly impact the 
supply side, i.e. NGA investment. Likewise, cost conditions will shift the supply curve but also exert 
an indirect impact on NGA adoption (section 4.3). Finally, the adoption process will be directly 
influenced by diverse demand-side factors and network effects (section 4.4). But, demand will be also 
related to regulation and competition which affect prices and quality and thus indirectly the adoption 
of NGA services.  
                                                     
6
  Full definitions of terms are also available at: http://s.ftthcouncil.org/files/FTTH-Definitions-
Revision_January_2009_0.pdf.  
7
  Because the length of FTTH/B lines is longer compared to other FTTx technologies and thus services a much 
smaller customer base in the last section, the average investment per FTTH/B connection is 
disproportionately higher (wik consult, 2008). 
8
  In our panel dataset Pearson´s bivariate correlation coefficients for FTTx coverage and FTTx adoption are 
0.7014 and 0.6982 in terms of connections per household and per capita, respectively.  
[6] 
4.1 Regulation 
In EU member states, where asymmetric ex ante regulation is imposed on first generation broadband 
markets, alternative operators can rent the local loop from the incumbent operator based on cost-
oriented access charges (“unbundling”). This allows alternative operators to provide (first of all) 
broadband services. Alternative operators may also offer retail broadband services by purchasing 
“bitstream” as a wholesale service from the incumbent operator but at a more service-based level of 
the value chain. Finally, wholesale broadband access via simple resale services means that access-
seeking operators receive and resell a wholesale input of the incumbent operator without any scope of 
technological product differentiation (RTR, 2010, pp. 176, 179). 
Specific forms of NGA regulation will be defined and imposed by NRA´s only in future decisions or, 
if already implemented, the effectiveness of these decisions remains to be seen (Cullen International, 
2011, Tables 4, 9 and 10). We argue, however, that past regulation in first generation broadband 
markets has clearly shaped expectations for NGA regulations. This has been recently confirmed in 
NGA relevant recommendations of the EC as well as in previous court decisions.
9
  
On the one hand, stricter wholesale access regulations increase service-based competition at the retail 
level in terms of better services and lower broadband prices which exerts a positive impact on the 
demand side. On the other hand, tight regulation of existing broadband access products will, as 
mentioned above, most likely create corresponding expectations about future regulation of NGA 
access products which decrease investment incentives of (potential) infrastructure operators for the 
following: (i) imposing cost-oriented access prices for bottleneck inputs will typically reduce profits or 
preclude excess profits of the regulated firm, which results in an asymmetric distribution of expected 
profits and, therefore, in a lower net present value of investment projects (Valetti, 2003). Furthermore, 
access regulation typically ignores (ii) opportunity costs of real options (Guthrie, 2009) and that (iii) 
risks were distributed asymmetrically among regulated incumbent and entrant operators. Therefore, 
(iv), regulation not only reduces investment incentives of regulated infrastructure operators but also of 
potential entrant infrastructure operators who benefit from a risk-free option due to mandatory access 
obligations asymmetrically imposed on the incumbent operator (Pindyck, 2007). Finally, pending 
decisions on NGA regulations have already led to substantial regulatory uncertainty which constitutes 
another investment impediment. According to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), who model the effects of 
different regulatory regimes on NGA investment, a regime of less intense access regulations or 
                                                     
9
  The NGA recommendation of the European Commission (2010b) as well as former draft versions clearly 
indicate that the EC is very much determined to extend its cost-based regulatory approach to emerging NGA 
communications infrastructure. The reader is also referred to the earlier decision of the German government 
to exempt the incumbent operator (Deutsche Telekom) from wholesale access obligations to its new 
infrastructure (VDSL) network (“regulatory holidays”). The EC, however, took Germany to court over this 
legal provision in 2007, which finally decided against it in 2009 (C-424/07).  
[7] 
regulatory holidays would have the most positive effects on investment, whereas the current EU 
standard of strict cost-based access regulation turns out to be inferior.
10
 
Summarizing, we expect that ex ante sector-specific regulation in the form of mandatory access 
regimes has a negative impact on NGA investment and hence indirectly also on adoption of NGA 
services. Higher levels of regulatory induced service-based competition, however, also lower prices 
and enhance better services which increases demand and NGA adoption. 
4.2 Competition 
Telecommunications, by all means, has become one of the most dynamic and competitive industries 
since the beginning of the EU liberalization process in 1997/98. Likewise, recent and future 
investment in NGA is driven by inter-platform competition, most notably, from mobile networks, 
which ”threaten” first generation (copper and cable) networks and services. The so-called phenomenon 
of fixed-to-mobile substitution has been already quite intense with respect to narrowband voice 
telephony services at the beginning of NGA deployment (around 2005) and has become increasingly 
important until now, not only regarding voice telephony but also more and more broadband services.
11
  
With respect to the potential impact of inter-platform competition on NGA investment, one has to 
distinguish the following opposed effects (Aghion et al., 2005): On the one hand, competitive markets 
bear incentives for innovative investment in view of temporary market power rents that can be 
captured (“escape competition effect”) which leads to a positive relation between inter-platform 
competition and NGA investment. Indeed, the deployment of NGA networks can be seen as the “last 
chance” for traditional wireline infrastructure operators to successfully escape broadband competition 
stemming from mobile networks with innovative and high-bandwidth demanding NGA services which 
cannot be realized by means of mobile broadband technologies in the foreseeable future. On the other 
hand, intense inter-platform competition in terms of pronounced fixed-to-mobile substitution will 
eventually reduce potential rents and, thus, increasingly counteract NGA investment because operators 
are no longer able to appropriate necessary profits from NGA investment (“Schumpeterian” effect).  
Finally, one has to consider the “replacement effect” (Arrow, 1962), according to which new NGA 
investment would “cannibalise” quasi-monopolistic profits from old first generation (legacy and coax-
                                                     
10
  See also Briglauer and Gugler (2012) who evaluate NGA deployments in different geographical areas (Asia, 
EU and US) in view of the underlying regulatory approaches with a particular focus on the investment 
incentives of the current EU regulatory framework.  
11
  According to the EC’s “Indicators on the electronic communications market” the average EU mobile 
broadband penetration of all users (PC’s/Laptops and handheld devices) is about 41%, whereas fixed 
broadband penetration for the EU average is 27.7% (including basic and high speed connections) as of 
January 2012. Regarding the number of subscribers, fixed-to-mobile substitution is even more pronounced: 
Whereas the average EU number of mobile subscribers increased constantly up to 127% by the end of 2011, 
the average number of fixed-line connections decreased significantly in recent years. All data is available at 
the EC’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard website: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/scoreboard.  
[8] 
based) broadband services which increases opportunity costs and thus reduces the incentive to invest.
12
 
The replacement effect appears to be of practical relevance, as most EU27 member states have well 
established first generation infrastructure in view of both network coverage and recent and foreseeable 
advances in DSL technology standards. As a result conventional broadband services enjoy broad 
consumer acceptance in most EU member states which also establishes some non-negligible switching 
costs on consumers´ side and hinders migration to the new technology unless its incremental benefits 
are large and transparent enough for consumers (Grajek and Kretschmer, 2009, p. 241). 
Summarizing, we expect a non-linear relationship between NGA investment and the intensity of 
infrastructure-based competition from mobile networks. At the same time an increase in competitive 
intensity has – in the same manner as regulatory-induced service-based competition – a positive 
impact on adoption of NGA services, i.e. on the demand side, as infrastructure-based competition will 
enhance better services and reduce the average broadband price level. With respect to the replacement 
effect, we expect that a higher diffusion of first generation broadband connections leads to a lower 
adoption of second generation NGA services. 
4.3 Cost factors  
Civil engineering and construction costs related to digging represent by far the most relevant cost 
drivers for NGA deployment. As these cost factors are largely fixed and sunk costs, one can expect 
that average deployment costs will decrease with the number of broadband/NGA subscribers 
(“economies of density”; wik, 2008). Furthermore, these deployment costs will crucially depend on 
largely time-invariant topographic and demographic characteristics such as urbanization, population or 
household density and housing structure, particularly the number of multi-dwelling-units, is a major 
issue (FTTH Council Europe, 2012, pp. 24-25). 
Relevant institutional factors such as regulations on capital costs, rights of way and digging or other 
allowances and technical standards, local availability of ducts and dark fiber or NGA specific state aid 
policies also show hardly any variation with respect to the relevant time frame of our analysis.  
4.4 Demand factors 
Demand and willingness to pay depend on the average price for high-speed broadband services, the 
overall market size in terms of total communications expenditure and consumer wealth in general. 
Consumers with higher average communications expenditures can be regarded as being more affine 
with information and communications technologies (ICT) which might result in higher NGA 
penetration rates (FTTH Council Europe, 2012, p. 42). Demand for NGA services will also be driven 
by a variety of consumer and quality characteristics. Regarding the latter, which refer to performance 
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  See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a more general description of the replacement effect in the communications 
industry. 
[9] 
parameters such as latency, jitter and speed, it is typically difficult to obtain consistent data. Consumer 
characteristics refer to the overall affinity to ICT, conventional internet usage and usage intensity of 
high-speed broadband services as well as average education levels. Higher levels of education will 
improve e-literacy skills which are required for NGA technologies. Also, higher educated people tend 
to be more prone to adopt and experiment with new ICT (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002, p. 302).  
Finally, one has to consider network effects as a special type of externality underlying the NGA 
adoption process, in case that the number of subscribers (and/or producers) has an impact on the 
consumers´ utility (firms` profit) (Shy, 2010). In general, increases in adoption rates also lead to 
increases in usage intensity of the respective services (Grajek and Kretschmer, 2009, p. 240). 
Consumers´ utility can be either directly related to the possibility of communicating with one another 
at the consumer level, e.g. via different “Web 2.0” platforms, or indirectly, in case network effects 
occur at different producer levels: For instance, the more users subscribe to (high-speed) internet 
services, the more specific content and related applications will be programmed, which increases the 
consumers´ utility and willingness to adopt such (NGA) services. The same is true for the 
development of related hardware and electronic equipment. Furthermore, it is likely that the NGA 
adoption process is subject to learning spillovers, inasmuch as the value added of NGA services 
appears to be a priori unknown to potential consumers whose valuation will inter alia depend on the 
information gathered by the already existing subscriber base (Grajek, 2010, p. 133). Operators simply 
benefit from network size, since an increase in the total number of subscribers lowers average costs 
significantly in view of the NGA network topology and thus increases profits.  
All network effects described above give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process which 
suggests that contemporaneous and previous NGA adoption rates are positively related leading to a 
virtuous circle: the higher the existing subscriber base, the higher potential network benefits.  
5 Data and variables 
The empirical specification is based on the following data sources: The “EU Progress Report” 
provides yearly data for all relevant wholesale broadband access regulations. Our second main source 
is the database of FTTH Council Europe which includes annual numbers of connected NGA lines for 
all EU27 member states. EUROSTAT / COCOM provide data on total population, education, internet 
usage and ICT labour costs as well as housing structure. We use the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) data to measure inter-platform mobile competition and Quantum-Web tariff data for a 
representative measure of the average broadband price that is related to first generation infrastructure. 
Finally, data from the World Bank provide us with GDP per capita, the European Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) with measures of labour and wage costs and the percentage of people living in urban areas and 
EUROMONITOR with telecommunications revenues, the number of households and internet users.  
[10] 
As data availability varies by variable, we use an unbalanced panel dataset of EU27 countries for the 
time range from 2004 to 2011 for yearly data on our independent variables and from 2005 to 2012 for 
yearly data on our dependent variable. All variable definitions and sources as well as summary 
statistics are listed in detail in the Annex in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, FTTx_hh, measures adoption in terms of the actual number of households 
connected by relevant FTTx technologies:
13
 In line with the description in section 3, this includes 
FTTH/B/C and Fibre to the last amplifier. The dependent variable thus represents the number of 
households exhibiting a sufficient willingness to pay and actively using one of the FTTx-based NGA 
services under a commercial contract (“homes connected”).  
5.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables can be divided into the following categories: (i) regulation, (ii) 
infrastructure-based competition, (iii) prices and (iv) cost and demand controls.  
5.2.1 Regulation 
The regulation variable, reg_bb, measures the lines actively used by service-based competitors as the 
share of total regulated wholesale broadband lines (including unbundling, bitstream and resale) related 
to total retail broadband lines. Therefore, this variable not only includes all wholesale broadband 
access regulations as outlined in section 4.1, but it also provides a direct measure of their 
effectiveness.
14
  
Furthermore, as outlined in section 4.1, it can be argued that the effectiveness of regulation of the 
“old” network infrastructure, reg_bb, is exogenous with respect to the deployment of “new” 
                                                     
13
  The other metric commonly used is homes connected in per capita terms. Both measures have each their 
strengths and weaknesses. Adoption in per capita terms refers to both, business and residential users, 
whereas household penetration omits business customers. However, household subscription data seems to be 
the more correct measure as fixed-wireline (NGA) connections are typically related to a single household 
but not to an individual subscriber (as is the case for wireless subscriptions). Hence we prefer household 
data, but – as it will be shown – our estimates are robust to the alternative specification in per capita terms. 
14
  As a consequence, we do not have to rely on broadly defined indices, dummy-based scorecards or other 
proxies, which are commonly used in related literature but hardly related to fixed broadband wholesale 
access regulations (such as the OECD regulatory index for the telecoms sector). The “Polynomics 
Regulation Index 2012” (Zenhäusern et al., 2012) is most related to the EU regulatory framework, but it is 
available only up to 2010 and captures only formal aspects of regulation but not its effectiveness. For 
instance, certain access regulations imposed by NRA´s might exist on paper for years without any real effect 
on relevant markets. In contrast, our measure incorporates the actual market effectiveness of ex ante 
regulations by linking these to the corresponding market outcomes (the same argument in favor of 
effectivity-based measures can be found in Bacache et al., 2012, or Briglauer et al. 2013). The Polynomics 
regulatory index 2012 is available for the years from 1997 to 2010 at: http://www.polynomics.ch/rdi.php. 
[11] 
infrastructure. At the same time, previous regulation on broadband markets is a rather reasonable – and 
in fact the best – proxy for expected NGA regulation, inasmuch as reg_bb represents the most related 
remedial measures within the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets.  
5.2.2 Competition 
The main form of inter-platform competition related to first generation infrastructure services stems 
from mobile networks. The variable fms states the share of fixed landlines to the total number of fixed 
landlines and mobile subscriptions and hence expresses the extent of fixed-to-mobile substitution, fms, 
in a country. Its net impact depends on the relative importance of the escape competition and 
Schumpeterian effect. bb_lines_hh measuers a country´s diffusion of first generation (copper and 
coax) broadband connections and services and, therefore, it directly captures the replacement effect 
and it is expected to negatively impact NGA adoption. cable measures the share of broadband cable 
lines whereas 1 - cable roughly corresponds to the share of DSL incumbent broadband lines. Both 
variables measure the relative importance of the main modes of intra-platform competition. 
5.2.3 Prices 
As outlined in sections 4.1 and 4.2, the net impact of regulation and competition on NGA adoption is 
undetermined, since regulatory-induced service-based competition influences prices and thus adoption 
on the demand side but it also negatively affects NGA investment on the supply side which decreases 
NGA adoption. Likewise, a high level of infrastructure-based competition brings down broadband 
prices but, beyond a certain level, also deteriorates NGA investment. In order to isolate the direct 
supply-side effects of the competition and regulation variables, one has to account for the market 
outcome that is related to first generation competition by controlling for the average broadband price 
level, price_bb. The net impact of the variable price_bb on NGA adoption is determined by the 
following opposing effects: (i) In case first and second generation broadband services are substitutes, 
an increase in price_bb shifts demand and increases NGA adoption. (ii) To the extent that price_bb 
stands proxy for NGA prices, an increase in price_bb will decrease NGA adoption alongside the 
demand curve. (iii) To the extent that price_bb stands proxy for a general broadband price level, an 
increase in price_bb will expand aggregate demand for broadband services and thus NGA adoption 
increases also. Finally, (iv) in case price_bb stands proxy for average revenue per user and willingness 
to pay for high-speed broadband services, an increase in price_bb induces additional NGA investment 
and thus increases NGA adoption. Since demand factors inter alia control for willingness to pay 
(section 5.2.5) and as we also control for the substitute infrastructure, bb_lines_hh,
15
 we presume that 
the effects in (ii) and (iii) are predominant and thus expect a negative sign of price_bb. 
                                                     
15
  In case the income effect is negligible, symmetry of net substitution implies that 
0__/___/)_ln( hhFttxpricehhlinesbbbbpricehhFttx , once we control for bb_lines_hh. 
[12] 
5.2.4 Cost controls 
We use the following measures for the demographic and topographic cost factors: Whereas urban_pop 
reflects different cost structures due to varying shares of rural and densely populated areas, hh_dens 
represents a country´s average household size and therefore a measure for the housing structure. The 
yearly number of building permissions of multiple dwelling units, mdw, provides another measure of 
household structure. 
We use the following measures for NGA construction costs: Whereas lab_cost represents an annual 
labour cost index, lab_cost_ICT gives an annual labour cost index that is related to ICT industries and 
wage measures manufacturing costs per hour. 
5.2.5 Demand controls 
Total telecommunications revenues normalised to households, telco_rev_hh, act as a proxy for the ICT 
market size and, thus, for the overall willingness to pay for broadband/NGA services in a country. 
GDP_pc_pp measures income effects. Furthermore, we include the variable iday, which provides the 
share of the population that uses the internet frequently and i_iugm, which provides the share of 
population that uses bandwidth intense internet applications to cover NGA relevant consumer 
characteristics. The number of internet users per capita, int_user_pc, represents a proxy for the overall 
ICT affinity within a country. The educational level, edu, is measured as the percentage of adult 
population that has completed at least upper secondary education.  
Finally, network effects are considered by adding the lagged dependent variable, Fttx_hh(t-1), as a right-
hand-side variable to the empirical specification. Fttx_hh(t-1) measures the installed subscriber base and 
thus aggregate demand in the previous period. 
6 Empirical specification 
6.1 The model 
As can be inferred from the literature review, some studies focus on broadband penetration, i.e. 
demand, while others focus on investment, i.e., supply of broadband/NGA connections. Only a few 
empirical studies explicitly identify broadband/NGA supply and/or demand or outline the underlying 
reduced form approach. Our baseline specification refers to a reduced form model where demand is 
expressed in terms of NGA household adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hh). Imposing the equilibrium 
condition (demand = supply) eliminates the endogenous NGA related price variable and yields the 
following econometric reduced form specification:
16
 
                                                     
16
  For a similar approach see Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006, p. 450-451). The authors, however, do 
not eliminate the endogenous price variable but pool the whole set of available demand and supply variables 
in their specification of broadband penetration.  
[13] 
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Equation (1) depends on the main variables of interest, i.e., regulation and competition, in member 
state i in year t, as well as on a vector of demand and cost controls (Zi(t-1)). Note that Zi(t-1) also contains 
a measure of the average broadband price level, price_bb, that explicitly controls for the competitive 
outcome in first generation broadband markets which allows estimating the direct supply-side effect of 
regulation and competition. The additive error term εit is assumed to be i.i.d and θi represents country-
specific effects. Equation (1) includes lagged values of all exogenous variables in order to fully 
employ the availability of our panel dataset.
17
  
Any adoption process is inherently dynamic and thus it is crucial to separate out adequately the 
technological diffusion effects from explanatory variables. The vast majority of the related empirical 
literature finds that (ICT) adoption processes are best described through S-shaped (logistic or 
Gompertz) functional curves which represent different versions of an exponential growth model which 
ultimately converges to some saturation level.
18
 But, even in fibre-leading European countries the 
NGA adoption processes is still in its early phase and far from being close to respective inflection 
points.
19
 Therefore, NGA adoption can be approximated by a simpler exponential growth model in 
equation (1) which relates NGA adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hhit), to a linear time trend, t.
20
  
Equation (2) represents a dynamic extension of the baseline specification in equation (1) where the 
lagged dependent variable, ln(FTTx_hhi(t-1)), is included as a right-hand side variable (instead of the 
linear time trend, t). The coefficient α1 measures the importance of network effects which give rise to 
an endogenous adoption process if 0 < α1 < 1. 1 - α1 measures the constant “speed of diffusion”, λ, that 
comes from a Gompertz model of adoption (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002, pp. 299-300). λ is expressed as 
the percentage of the gap between the long-run (desired or target) stock of NGA subscribers and 
                                                     
17
  With an insufficient number of observations one would run the risk of over fitting the data. Also, assuming 
that adoption decisions at a particular point in time do not depend on contemporaneous but on last period´s 
conditions makes good sense as consumer´s adoption process will typically be – although to a much lesser 
extent than investment decisions of firms (Briglauer et al. 2013) – related to some non-negligible consumer 
inertia related to technology adjustment and switching costs. 
18
  For recent and ICT related diffusion studies see e.g. Czernich et al. (2011), Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) or 
Lee et al. (2011).  
19
  For recent evidence see Briglauer and Gugler (2012) or Samanta et al. (2012). In particular, note that one can 
infer from Figure A.1 that almost all EU27 states are far from the adoption target defined in the EC´s Digital 
Agenda (“50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps”). 
20
  Also, a log transformation helps to stabilize the series of our dependent variable. This represents a positive 
side effect in view of potential non-stationarity problems which cannot be tested formally given that our 
panel dataset is unbalanced and neither the number of time periods (T ≤ 8) nor the number of cross-sectional 
units (n ≤ 27) tend to infinity (“Im-Pesaran-Shin” unit-root test is designed for unbalanced panels but 
requires at least 10 observations per panel). 
[14] 
subscribers in the previous period that is closed each period (Andres et al., 2010; Kiiski and Pohjola, 
2002; Grajek and Röller, 2012).
21
 Again, the additive error term µit is assumed to be i.i.d: 
(2) 
ittiiti
titititiit
hhFttx
hhlinesbbfmsfmsbbreghhFttx
)_ln(
___)_ln(
)1(1)1(
)1(4)1(
2
3)1(2)1(10
Z
 
Estimating the reduced form in equations (1) and (2) enables comparative static analysis which 
appears to be of prime importance for policy makers and in view of our policy-oriented research 
questions.
22
  
6.2 Identification 
The desire to measure causation and to avoid endogeneity in spite of reliance on non-experimental 
data is the key concern in empirical economics (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 715; Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 421). We argue, first of all, that the main source of endogeneity in the form of reverse 
causality is effectively eliminated by the reduced form approach in equations (1) and (2): As we assess 
the impact of demand and supply-side determinants related to first generation broadband markets on 
second generation NGA markets, one can hardly imagine that current NGA adoption influences, for 
instance, previous regulation on broadband markets which was implemented by NRAs typically many 
years ago. Accordingly, reverse causality that might otherwise lead to endogeneity should represent no 
problem. Second, by lagging the explanatory variables, NGA adoption is related to pre-determined 
values of the independent variables. In order to reinforce these arguments, we also perform standard 
Granger causality tests. Third, we control for potential endogeneity due to unobserved and time-
invariant heterogeneity by including fixed effects (θi) at the country level.  
7 Empirical results23 
Table 1 shows the main results using fixed effects (“FE”) regressions to estimate our baseline 
specification (equation (1)). Regression (1) reports FE estimates for the model specification which 
contains all demand and cost controls (“Full”). The F-test (F_θ) following regression (1) shows that 
country level FE are significant, implying that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates if the 
FE are correlated with the independent variables. Regression (1) reports t-statistics assuming that the 
errors in equation (1) are i.i.d, which might induce misleading inference as well (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, pp. 711-712). Therefore, one has to control for both serial correlation and any arbitrary form of 
heteroscedasticity by calculating robust standard errors. For short panels (T ≤ 8 in our case) this 
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  Let Fttx_hhit
*
 denote the desired long-run stock of NGA subscribers, then the Gompertz model of diffusion 
specifies the rate of change as )__(ln(_/1/_ )1(
*
tiititit hhFttxhhFttxhhFttxthhFttx . 
22
  For the sake of clarity we drop the cross-sectional index in the remainder of the paper. 
23
  STATA 12.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
[15] 
strategy is preferred over modelling a specific error correlation structure (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 
p. 725). Regression (2) contains FE estimates for the full model based on robust standard errors 
(“rob”). Note, however, that robust standard errors still assume that there is no contemporaneous 
correlation across the panel units. Typically, spatial dependence is unlikely to exist at the country level 
with short time series. Yet, Pesaran´s test of cross sectional independence does not provide 
unambiguous evidence (the statistic is -1.721 with a p-value of 0.0852 for regression (3)). Regression 
(5) therefore reports “Driscoll-Kraay” standard errors (“DK”) which are assumed to be 
heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the panels (Driscoll 
and Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007). 
In regressions (3) to (5) we eliminated all except the significant demand controls (int_user_pc(t-1), 
edu(t-1)) and the least insignificant cost controls (wage(t-1), urban(t-1)).
24
 As it can be seen, the basic 
structure of the coefficients for the main variables remains effectively unchanged throughout 
regressions (1) to (5) which reassures us that those estimates are largely robust to alternative selections 
of control variables. The demand controls int_user_pc(t-1) and edu(t-1) are statistically significant with 
expected signs in all regressions in Table 1 and appear to best capture ICT affinity and e-literacy, 
respectively, as essential pre-conditions for the usage of high-speed broadband services.  
The cost controls wage(t-1) and urban(t-1) are not only insignificant but the variable urban(t-1) also has 
unexpected sign in regressions (1) and (2). Whereas insignificant cost estimates appear to be primarily 
due to country FE (low within variation),
25
 the unexpected sign of urban(t-1) might be attributed to two 
opposing effects: First, in densely populated areas, NGA deployment can serve more customers at the 
same time, so reducing the costs for a single fibre connection (economies of density). Second, 
however, total digging costs are much higher in urban areas where construction activities become 
more labour intensive. We therefore included the interaction term urban*wage(t-1) in regressions (3) to 
(5) to capture this relationship. Indeed, urban(t-1) then shows the expected sign and its impact on NGA 
adoption decreases with increases in the wage level, wage(t-1), in regressions (3) to (5). 
With respect to period effects, we find that the linear time trend, t, is significant in regressions (3) and 
(5). With a constant annual growth rate of 0.5324 (= [exp(0.4268) – 1]) in regression (3), the number 
of homes connected would increase from its average value (0.05147) to the Digital Agenda´s target 
value (0.5) in about 5.4 years. Note, however, that this represents the most optimistic case, since 
constant exponential growth is unlikely to continue in later phases of the adoption process. We also 
estimated regression (3) as two-way FE by including year dummies instead of the linear time trend. 
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  Whereas urban(t-1) stands for demographic cost factors, wage(t-1) stands for construction costs. wage(t-1) is 
preferred over labcost_ict(t-1), since only the former has expected (meaningful) sign. 
25
  A second-stage regression using the estimated FE of regression (3) as the dependent variable shows that the 
variation in FE can be explained to a large extent by (highly) time-invariant demand and cost controls which 
are excluded from regression (3); results are available upon request from the author. 
[16] 
However, the year dummies are jointly insignificant (F-statistic is 0.92; not reported in Table 1) and 
hence inclusion would result in less efficient estimates.  
Overall, we refer to regressions (3) to (5) as final regressions (“Final”) as these are the most efficient 
specifications. When comparing regression (3) with regression (5) one finds that imposing “Driscoll-
Kraay” standard errors substantially increases significance levels. But, as the estimator is based on an 
asymptotic theory, we have to consider the results with caution in view of our short panel structure. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 2 first represents in regression (6) the estimation results of model “Final_FE_rob”, which we 
consider as our most appropriate specification (= regression (3) in Table 1). Regression (7) shows that 
coefficient estimates are virtually unchanged if we normalize our dependent variable with respect to 
total population (“pop”) instead of total number of households. The first difference (“FD”) 
specification in regression (8) also eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity but entails a substantial loss 
in efficiency. FD still shows similar estimates except for the coefficient of our regulation variable, 
reg_bb(t-1), which has expected sign but is less well identified. Regression (9) reports the results of the 
random effects (RE) specification. Although RE coefficients show a similar structure and a similar 
coefficient estimate for the variable reg_bb(t-1), the FE specifications are clearly preferred in view of 
our observational dataset.
26
  
Finally, regression (10) contains the estimation results of the specification which includes the lagged 
dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), as an additional regressor (equation (2)). Estimating regression 
(10) by means of an ordinary FE (within or LSDV) estimator would yield inconsistent and biased 
results, since the lagged dependent variable and the error terms would be correlated (Nickell, 1981). 
Bruno (2005a,b) developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (“LSDVC”) for unbalanced panel data.27 
Again, the structure of the LSDVC estimation results in regression (10) is similar to the previous 
regressions and most coefficients of the main variables of interest are significant with expected signs. 
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  Conceptually, our analysis focuses on the EU27 member states which represent a particular set of rather 
homogenous countries and cannot be considered as a random sample drawn from the population of all 
countries. Empirically, a heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust Hausman test strongly rejects the RE model (in 
regression (6) the Sargan-Hansen test statistic is 71.025, not reported in Table 2), saying that RE estimates 
will be inconsistent.  
27
  A weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties only hold for a large number of cross-sectional units 
(n ≤ 27 in our case). Monte Carlo evidence supports the LSDVC estimator which proves to be (much) more 
efficient than various instrumental variable type estimators when n is small (Kiviet, 1995). However, 
LSDVC is not applicable in the presence of endogenous regressors (Bruno, 2005b). In view of the arguments 
in section 6.2, we are confident that there is no endogeneity problem as we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and also reverse causality appears to be unlikely with respect to our empirical specification. To 
prove the latter, we also perform standard Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969). The results, which are 
reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix, indicate that there is no bidirectional causality. 
[17] 
Apparently, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), is highly significant and 
substantial (α1 = 0.7056) in regression (10) which informs us about the relevance of network effects 
underlying the adoption of NGA services. A 10% increase in the number of NGA connections per 
household in the previous period leads to an increase of about 7.1% in the number of current NGA 
connections. Although a high value of α1 might be either due to true state dependency or correlation 
with unobserved heterogeneity (θi), a causal mechanism via the last period is very likely because of 
the high potential of network effects for adoption of new ICT services as outlined in section 4.4. The 
speed of diffusion (λ = 1 - 0.7056) suggests that it will take around 6.5 years to close 90% of the gap 
between the average number of NGA connections per household (0.05147) and the Digital Agenda´s 
target value (0.5). Also, note that λ is significantly greater than zero which confirms that migration to 
NGA services is subject to some non-negligible switching costs on side of the consumers. 
Regarding the main variables of interest, one first finds a significant and non-linear relationship with 
respect to our inter-platform competition variable, fms(t-1) and fms
2
(t-1), for all FE regressions (including 
LSDVC). The maximum of the non-linear relationship informs us about the optimal competitive 
market conditions for NGA adoption. For instance, one can infer from the corresponding coefficient 
estimate in regression (3) in Table 1 (= regression (6) in Table 2) that a share of ~19.5% of fixed 
landlines is optimal. The grand mean of fms(t-1) is ~26.88% and thus above this optimal value which 
means that the escape competition effect still dominates the Schumpeterian effect and fixed-to-mobile 
substitution exerted a positive impact on NGA adoption in the past. However, increasing competition 
from mobile networks brought the average value of this variable close to its optimum during the 
analysis period with )2004(fms  = 0.3317 and )2011(fms  = 0.2314.
28
  
The coefficient of the variable bb_lines_hh(t-1) is significantly negative in all FE regressions (excluding 
LSDVC) from which we infer that there is a substantial replacement effect with reference to the first 
generation broadband infrastructure. As the latter includes both DSL and cable connections, we also 
tested whether there is a differential effect with respect to these forms of intra-platform competition by 
including an additional interaction term, bb_lines*cable(t-1), in regression (4) in Table 1. As the 
corresponding coefficient is insignificant (as well as the coefficient of the main effect, cable(t-1)), we 
conclude that there is no differential impact and the replacement effect equally comes from both types 
of fixed broadband infrastructure. This result appears to be reasonable in view of rather similar quality 
and price characteristics of intra-modal coax and copper/DSL broadband retail services. 
Finally, we find a coefficient of the regulatory variable, reg_bb(t-1), which is estimated in the quite 
narrow range of -2.3210 to -2.3608 for the final FE regressions and significantly negative throughout 
all estimations (except for the FD specification). This strongly supports our hypothesis outlined in 
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  It is interesting to contrast this result with the corresponding finding in Briglauer et al. (2013) who measure 
mobile competition in a different way (based on survey data for the years from 2005 to 2010) but also find 
that competition stemming from mobile networks increased but is well below its optimum value on average.  
[18] 
section 4.1 that more intense regulation has a negative impact on adoption of NGA services once we 
control for the price effect. The average estimate of the coefficient of reg_bb(t-1) (~ -2.35) implies that 
an increase of regulatory intensity by 10 percentage points leads to a decrease of the NGA adoption by 
20.95% ([=exp(-2.35*0.1)-1]*100). Evaluated at the grand mean, which represents the average EU27 
member state, this implies an average decrease from 0.05147 to ~0.0407 NGA lines per household.  
The average broadband price variable, price_bb(t-1), is only marginally significant. As it has negative 
sign throughout, we infer that the price variable mainly stands proxy for NGA prices or for a general 
broadband price level as presumed. Indeed, if we drop price_bb(t-1) from the regressions, the coefficient 
of reg_bb(t-1) increases throughout in absolute terms (e.g., from ~-2.352 to ~-2.435 in regression (3)). 
However, since this increase is not significant, we infer that the negative direct impact of regulation on 
supply-side investment activities dominates the price effect on the demand side.  
(Table 2 about here) 
8 Summary and final remarks 
This work identifies the effects of sector-specific ex ante regulation and infrastructure competition on 
the adoption of NGA services in Europe using a recent panel dataset of EU27 countries. As opposed to 
previous related literature, the econometric specification explicitly addresses the endogeneity problem 
mainly by relating NGA adoption to regulation and competition on preceding broadband markets.  
The results, first, indicate that NGA adoption is negatively influenced by the extent and effectiveness 
of wholesale broadband access regulation that is imposed on the incumbent’s first generation DSL 
infrastructure. Also, it should be pointed out that the impact of regulation is quite substantial. 
Accordingly, the ambitious goals of the EC´s Digital Agenda seem to be at odds with the sector-
specific EU regulatory framework, which intends to expand strict cost-based access regulation to the 
emerging NGA infrastructure and corresponding NGA wholesale access services. Realizing the targets 
of the EC to reach 50% adoption with 100 Mbit/s high-speed internet connections until 2020, becomes 
much more unlikely if the prime importance is attached to high cost FTTH/B deployment scenarios 
(Briglauer and Gugler, 2012). Secondly, competition stemming from mobile networks impacts NGA 
adoption in a non-linear way as expected. With respect to the time-frame of our analysis, the positive 
impact of the escape competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect. Thirdly, we also found 
evidence of a significant replacement effect underlying the first generation broadband infrastructure, 
which might get even reinforced in the future in view of the potential of new DSL and coax 
technologies. Finally, our dynamic specification suggests that substantial network effects give rise to 
an endogenous NGA adoption process. As this process exhibits a high growth potential, the target of 
the EC appears to be still feasible time-wise, if one refers to a broad NGA definition and if NGA 
adoption is not endangered by shocks on the demand or supply side or, most notably, by wrong policy 
incentives.  
[19] 
It should be noted once again that the intention of the paper is neither to identify demand or supply 
related to NGA adoption and deployment, respectively, nor to analyze the dynamics of the involved 
adjustment processes; instead, the paper focused on the marginal effects of the main policy variables 
of interest by means of comparative static analysis. In view of the dynamic interaction of supply and 
demand, a proverbial chicken-and-egg situation appears to arise: It is not clear a priori, whether there 
have to be demand for new, attractive services in advance in order to enforce deployment of new 
communications infrastructure or if those services and applications will automatically evolve after the 
necessary infrastructure has already been put in place. Internet history indicates that the development 
of content and applications usually followed infrastructure deployment, e.g. there would be none of 
the web 2.0 services and social platforms available in a world with narrowband dial-up internet 
infrastructure. This view suggests that the ambitious goals of the EC´s Digital Agenda can be reached 
best, if NGA deployment is primarily supply-side driven; either by means of deregulatory approaches 
or via optimal competitive market conditions as indicated by our results and the vast majority of the 
broadband related literature. In addition, state aid intervention targeted to supply NGA deployment in 
non-profitable areas or to stimulate the speed of technology diffusion might be considered as effective 
and complementary policy instruments. 
  
[20] 
Table 1: Estimation results for the adoption model (dependent variable: ln(Fttx_hhit)) 
Regression (nr.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full_FE Full_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob_i 
Final_FE_ 
rob_DK 
reg_bb(t-1) -1.8962** -1.8962** -2.3515*** -2.3166** -2.3515*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.33) (-2.99) (-2.74) (-4.08) 
      
price_bb(t-1) -0.0258* -0.0258* -0.0270 -0.0266 -0.0270*** 
 (-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.58) (-1.50) (-5.60) 
      
fms(t-1) 57.1295*** 57.1295* 45.0935** 47.0737** 45.0935*** 
 (3.60) (1.97) (2.27) (2.19) (4.84) 
      
fms
2
(t-1) -136.263*** -136.2630** -115.5386** -115.9163** -115.54*** 
 (-4.67) (-2.39) (-2.75) (-2.66) (-5.62) 
      
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -6.6056*** -6.6056*** -4.9070* -5.2888** -4.9070*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.94) (-1.99) (-2.22) (-4.12) 
      
int_user_pc(t-1) 8.1608** 8.1608** 5.1423** 4.4192 5.1423*** 
 (2.00) (2.18) (2.14) (1.46) (3.43) 
      
edu(t-1) 0.2315*** 0.2315*** 0.1577** 0.1516* 0.1577* 
 (2.98) (3.15) (2.22) (2.00) (1.94) 
      
telco_rev_hh(t-1) 51.5279 51.5279    
 (0.11) (0.08)    
      
i_iday(t-1) -0.8730 -0.8730    
 (-0.17) (-0.13)    
      
i_iugm(t-1) -1.2253 -1.2253    
 (-0.41) (-0.41)    
      
gdp_pc_ppp(t-1) 0.0000 0.0000    
 (0.46) (0.65)    
      
hh_dens(t-1) 2.4201 2.4201    
 (0.60) (0.63)    
      
labcost_ict(t-1) 0.0276 0.0276    
 (1.09) (0.90)    
      
labcost(t-1) -0.0071 -0.0071    
 (-0.41) (-0.45)    
      
wage(t-1) -0.1330 -0.1330 0.9914 0.8436 0.9914* 
 (-0.66) (-0.78) (1.40) (1.24) (1.82) 
      
urban(t-1) -0.3195 -0.3195 0.1094 0.1736 0.1094 
 (-1.19) (-0.97) (0.31) (0.46) (0.44) 
  
[21] 
mdw(t-1) -0.0026 -0.0026    
 (-0.73) (-0.72)    
      
t 0.3753 0.3753 0.4268* 0.4886* 0.4268*** 
 (1.40) (1.17) (1.71) (1.76) (4.78) 
      
urban*wage(t-1)   -0.0161 -0.0145 -0.0161** 
   (-1.57) (-1.49) (-2.28) 
      
bb_lines*cable(t-1)    -10.3659  
    (-0.78)  
      
cable_entr(t-1)    10.5496  
    (0.87)  
      
Constant -12.2036 -12.2036 -25.0350 -29.5231 -25.0350* 
 (-0.52) (-0.45) (-1.07) (-1.18) (-1.78) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.634 0.705 0.731 0.723  
R
2
_o 0.0202 0.0202 0.0226 0.0350  
R
2
_w 0.7406 0.7406 0.7482 0.7439 0.7482 
F 16.6541 176.1775 26.5819 26.4628 1685.8718 
F_θ 7.8923     
RMSE 0.9353 0.8406 0.8530 0.8563  
Obs 149 149 175 174 175 
Regressions (1) to (5) include country-specific fixed effects (FE) which are not reported. t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (2) to (5). Indeed, a Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation indicates that there is first-order autocorrelation in the data. Likewise, a Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a constant variance. Regression (5) employs “Driscoll-
Kraay” standard errors (“DK”), where the autocorrelation structure has a lag length of 
m(T)=floor[4(T/100)^(2/9)] which turned out to be robust to alternative lag specifications. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01   
[22] 
Table 2: Estimation results for different specifications of the “Final” adoption model  
Regression nr. (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Final_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_
rob_pop 
Final_FD_ 
rob 
RE_Final_ 
rob 
LSDVC_Final 
lnFttx_hh(t-1)     0.7056
***
 
     (8.82) 
      
reg_bb(t-1) -2.3515
***
 -2.3608
***
 -0.6629 -2.6598
***
 -2.1195
***
 
 (-2.99) (-2.99) (-1.52) (-2.68) (-2.83) 
      
price_bb(t-1) -0.0270 -0.0274 -0.0214
*
 -0.0277 -0.0243
***
 
 (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.81) (-1.49) (-2.70) 
      
fms(t-1) 45.0935
**
 44.9592
**
 27.3118 29.8178 18.0557
*
 
 (2.27) (2.26) (1.50) (1.33) (1.90) 
      
fms
2
(t-1) -115.5386
**
 -115.5528
**
 -63.7250
*
 -71.9990 -39.9050
**
 
 (-2.75) (-2.73) (-1.74) (-1.55) (-2.08) 
      
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -4.9070
*
 -4.9498
*
 -4.1934
**
 -3.0706 -1.0464 
 (-1.99) (-2.01) (-2.12) (-1.34) (-0.72) 
      
int_user_pc(t-1) 5.1423
**
 5.0215
**
 4.3991
**
 6.5363
***
 2.0246 
 (2.14) (2.11) (2.60) (3.04) (0.91) 
      
edu(t-1) 0.1577
**
 0.1581
**
  0.0292 0.0338 
 (2.22) (2.22)  (0.94) (0.50) 
      
urban(t-1) 0.1094 0.1164  -0.0131 -0.0107 
 (0.31) (0.33)  (-0.25) (-0.04) 
      
wage(t-1) 0.9914 1.0140  -0.0284 -0.0699 
 (1.40) (1.43)  (-0.15) (-0.11) 
      
urban*wage(t-1) -0.0161 -0.0164  0.0008 0.0002 
 (-1.57) (-1.60)  (0.35) (0.02) 
      
t 0.4268
*
 0.4325
*
  0.3365  
 (1.71) (1.73)  (1.54)  
      
Constant -25.0350 -26.3051 0.5745
***
 -12.1558
**
  
 (-1.07) (-1.12) (3.25) (-2.34)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.731 0.732 0.089   
R
2
_o 0.0226 0.0173  0.4763  
R
2
_w 0.7482 0.7493  0.7127  
F 26.5819 26.7343 2.2558   
RMSE 0.8530 0.8532 0.8385 0.9821  
Obs 175 175 149 175 162 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (6) to (9). LSDVC standard 
errors in regression (10) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction initialized by Arellano and 
Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T) . 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01   
[23] 
Annex 
Figure A.1: NGA household adoption levels for FTTx and FTTH/B technologies in the EU27 
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Horizontal reference line at 0.5 indicates target value of the EC´s Digital Agenda.
Source: FTTH Council Europe. Fttx and FttH/B household adoption levels are (essentially) zero in MT (CY).
As data for Luxembourg is available only for 2009 onwards and due to its exceptionally high FTTx adoption level, Luxemborug is not included in Figure A.1.
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Table A.1: Variable description and sources 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
 Dependent variable(s)  
FTTx connections 
per household, 
Fttx_hh, 
(Fttx_pop) 
Number of households connected by FTTx 
technologies normalised to a country´s total number 
of households,  
(normalised to total population) 
©FTTH Council 
Europe
(a)
 
 Main explanatory variables  
Extent of 
broadband access 
regulation, 
reg_bb (-) 
Share of regulated lines (local loop unbundling, 
bitstream, resale) to total retail broadband lines 
(minus cable entrant lines) 
EU Progress Report
(b)
 
Broadband price, 
price_bb (?/-) 
Average monthly cost of capped/uncapped residential 
fixed broadband for 1Mbps-10Mbps in Euro 
excluding VAT. Tariffs are a weighted average of 
representative stand-alone products of incumbent and 
entrant operators whose accumulative subscribers are 
over 90% of each country´s total broadband market 
©Quantum-Web 
Limited
(c)
 
Broadband lines, 
bb_lines_hh (-) 
Number of total retail broadband lines (DSL and 
coax) as a share of total number of households 
(“homes connected”) 
EU Progress Report 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
Fixed-to-mobile 
substitution, 
fms (+(levels) 
- (squared term)) 
Share of total number of fixed landlines to total 
number of fixed lines and mobile subscribers. 
Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions include the 
number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of 
active prepaid accounts (that have been used during 
the last three months). It excludes subscriptions via 
data cards or USB modems. Fixed-landlines refer to 
the number of active lines connecting subscribers’ 
terminal equipment to the PSTN 
ITU
(d)
 
Cable lines, 
cable (?) 
Number of total retail broadband cable lines run by 
entrants as a share of total retail broadband lines 
EU Progress Report 
 
 Control variables  
Education, 
edu (+) 
Percentage of adult population (25-64 years old) that 
has completed at least upper secondary education 
EUROSTAT
(e)
 
GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc_ppp (+) 
GDP per capita and PPP adjusted in current US$ World Bank
(f)
 
Average revenue, 
telco_rev_hh (+) 
Total telecommunications revenues in mn US$ per 
household with constant 2011 prices and fixed 2011 
exchange rates 
©EUROMONITOR
(g)
 
Heavy internet use, 
i_iugm (+) 
 
Share of population using bandwidth intense internet 
services (games, films, music...) 
EUROSTAT / 
COCOM 
Heavy internet 
users, 
i_iday (+) 
Share of population using internet services every or 
almost every day 
EUROSTAT / 
COCOM
(h)
 
[25] 
Table A.1: Variable description and sources (cont`d) 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
Household density, 
hh_dens (+) 
Average number of household members, expressed as 
a share of a country´s population to its total number 
of households 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
EUROSTAT 
(population) 
Internet users, 
int_user_pc (+) 
Internet users per capita ©EUROMONITOR 
ICT labor cost 
index,  
labcost_ICT (-) 
Annual ICT labor cost index normalised to 100 in 
2008  
EUROSTAT 
Labor cost index, 
labcost (-) 
Annual labor cost index normalised to 100 in 2005 © EIU
(i)
 
Multiple dwellings,  
mdw (+) 
Annual Building permits - number of two and more 
dwellings normalized to 100 in 2005 
EUROSTAT 
Wage per hour, 
wage (-) 
Wage per hour manufacturing in US$ with constant 
2011 prices, fixed 2011 exchange rates 
© EIU 
Urban population, 
urban (+) 
Urban population as a percentage of total population ©EIU 
* Note that some sources are commercially available only (©) while others are publicly available.  
(a) FTTH Council Europe is a non-profit industry organisation, whose aim is to enforce deployment of fibre 
optic technology in Europe. Data are collected by IDATE (www.idate.org) through desk research, direct contacts 
with FTTx players, information exchange with FTTH Council Europe members and from IDATE partners. Data 
from June 2005 to June 2011 and December 2011 (= 2012) are available to its members at: 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6. Data for Bulgaria and Luxembourg are available only for 
2009 onwards. There are no data for Malta and the number of subscribers for Cyprus is de facto time-constant 
and essentially null (with one rise from 100 to 120 FTTx lines). (b) The EU “Progress Report on the Single 
European Electronic Communications Market” for data from 2004 to 2011 is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.htm. There are 
missing values for Bulgaria and Romania for the years from 2004 to 2006. (c) Data are based on a quarterly 
monitoring service that harvests over 2000 fixed broadband tariffs across 100 countries. A few missing values for 
the variable price_bb had to be linearly interpolated. (d) ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 
is available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ (e) Data is available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database. Data for i_iugm is 
available only for the years from 2004 to 2010 and there are a few missing values for the variables i_iugm and 
iday which had to be linearly interpolated. (f) World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org. (g) Euromonitor International database is available at: http://www.euromonitor.com/. 
The number of households in 2012 was set equal to the number in 2011. (h) Data collected by EC services, 
through NRA´s, for the Communications Committee (COCOM). (i) Economist Intelligence Unit country 
database is available at: https://eiu.bvdep.com/frame.html.  
[26] 
Table A.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
Fttx_hh overall 0.0514702 0.1047494 3.77E-06 0.8574688 N = 191 
 
between 
 
0.1182229 0.0003915 0.6090008 n = 26 
 
within 
 
0.053404 -0.2063078 0.3651736 T = 7.35 
         Fttx_pop overall 0.0212465 0.0406438 1.52E-06 0.3171702 N = 191
 between  0.0442877 0.000135 0.2252358 n = 26 
 within  0.0218185 -0.0724796 0.1573267 T = 7.35 
         reg_bb overall 0.2435517 0.2218102 0 0.9947678 N = 210 
 
between 
 
0.1927122 0.0007791 0.7037244 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1177948 -0.1030858 0.9905862 T = 7.77 
         price_bb overall 29.76357 15.75987 5.26 99.89 N = 226 
 
between 
 
6.735677 14.76 42.9425 n = 27 
 
within 
 
14.45547 -1.438927 87.1408 T = 8.37 
         fms overall 0.2688139 0.0746535 0.1076148 0.437505 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.0652995 0.1467276 0.3925803 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0380519 0.1677713 0.4134962 T = 8 
         edu overall 68.26574 13.96395 26 86.1 N = 216 
 
between 
 
14.02081 28.7375 84.2125 n = 27 
 
within 
 
2.192978 61.44074 74.80324 T = 8 
         gdp_pc_ppp overall 29405.69 13476.8 8730.804 89055.8 N = 216 
 
between 
 
13352.13 12284.78 80394.91 n = 27 
 
within 
 
3024.771 13967.07 38066.58 T = 8 
         telco_rev_hh overall 0.0023742 0.0010328 0.0004868 0.0046744 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.001019 0.0007302 0.0041021 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0002493 0.0015673 0.0031638 T = 8 
         i_iday overall 0.4021399 0.1808903 0.036 0.8039 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.1431649 0.1363003 0.6732108 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1135449 0.1730875 0.6173487 T = 8 
         i_iugm overall 0.2317125 0.0926456 0.0479 0.5073836 N = 189 
 
between 
 
0.0711529 0.1299117 0.4058385 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0606799 -0.029026 0.4552803 T = 7 
         bb_lines_hh overall 0.4201162 0.2130044 0.0069897 0.8752053 N = 210 
 
between 
 
0.134138 0.1841686 0.6984428 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1673422 -0.0182887 0.7883213 T = 7.77 
  
[27] 
Table A.2: Summary statistics (cont`d) 
* n denotes the number of individual units and N denotes the total number of individual-time 
observations. Uppercase T denotes the number of time periods (annual observations).  
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
cable overall 0.0898561 0.0843489 0 0.377342 N = 209 
 
between 
 
0.0734082 0 0.2756474 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0423109 -0.1400215 0.2205538 T = 7.75 
         hh_dens overall 2.507075 0.2827785 1.999367 3.204768 N = 243 
 
between 
 
0.2841833 2.017063 3.002026 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0432815 2.404574 2.801087 T = 9 
         int_user_pc overall 0.6064277 0.1844711 0.1500006 0.9325179 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.1598241 0.3020208 0.8754859 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0965272 0.3604697 0.8102632 T = 8 
         labcost_ICT overall 96.27037 13.70907 47.7 165.1 N = 216 
 
between 
 
5.409287 82.0625 105.7625 n = 27 
 
within 
 
12.63451 57.79537 160.2454 T = 8 
         labcost overall 112.0291 21.62619 81.4439 226.7329 N = 213 
 
between 
 
13.68069 100.4715 153.58 n = 27 
 
within 
 
17 45.38391 193.4653 T = 7.89 
         mdw overall 89.98745 46.11853 9.96 344.11 N = 216 
 
between 
 
28.42763 43.29 184.8463 n = 27 
 
within 
 
36.6756 -15.2588 249.2512 T = 8 
         wage overall 16.00741 11.13623 1.6 51.4 N = 216 
 
between 
 
1.13E+01 1.975 49.75 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.7132549 13.35741 18.54491 T = 8 
         urban overall 72.08326 11.79625 48.6801 97.4358 N = 216 
 
between 
 
11.97782 49.31314 97.34392 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.5954232 69.90087 74.22487 T = 8 
         t overall 5 2.587318 1 9 N = 243 
 
between 
 
0 5 5 n = 27 
 
within 
 
2.587318 1 9 T = 9 
[28] 
Table A.3: Standard (direct) Granger causality tests with LSDVC* 
Regression nr. (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) 
Dependent var. logFttx_hh(t) reg_bb(t-1) price_bb(t-1) fms(t-1) 
Independent var.     
logFttx_hh(t-1) 0.7033***    
 (9.08)    
     
logFttx_hh(t-2)  -0.0226 0.0572 0.0002 
  (-1.23) (0.05) (0.12) 
     
logFttx_hh(t-3)  0.0077 -0.1574 0.0009 
  (0.53) (-0.17) (0.67) 
     
reg_bb(t-2) -1.2063* 0.2256* -6.2001 -0.0007 
 (-1.94) (1.80) (-0.73) (-0.05) 
     
price_bb(t-2) -0.0085 0.0004 0.4371*** 0.0000 
 (-0.79) (0.20) (3.51) (0.19) 
     
fms(t-2) 7.2783 1.2461 220.0209* 1.0701*** 
 (0.70) (0.66) (1.82) (10.41) 
     
fms
2
(t-2) -10.8759 -2.6688 -399.1218* -0.6293*** 
 (-0.58) (-0.70) (-1.66) (-3.18) 
     
Granger causality tests with p-values of χ2-tests of joint significance of respective 
coefficients displayed in bold in regressions (A.1) to (A.4): 
Prob > χ2 (lag1) 0.0365** 0.4637 0.9853 0.6585 
Obs 150 113 112 113 
Prob > χ2 (lag 2) 0.0780* 0.3005 0.6417 0.5080 
Obs 124 112 112 112 
* Since Granger causality tests require inclusion of lagged dependent variables, we had to use the LSDVC 
specification (regression (10) in Table 2). In order to test for reverse causality all variables with significant 
coefficients in regression (10) are considered. LSDVC calculates a bias-corrected LSDV estimator where the 
dependent variable is lagged once on the left hand side. Therefore, we include only one lag of the respective 
dependent variable in regressions (A.1) to (A.4). In regression (A.1) causation is established, since our main 
regulatory and competition variables are jointly significant in line with our baseline specification. The lower part 
of Table A.3 shows the p-values for the Granger χ2-test once for inclusion of one lag and once for inclusion of 
two lags of the independent variables (corresponding coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the latter case are 
not reported in Table A.3). For regressions (A.2) to (A.4) the Granger causality χ2-statistics are highly 
insignificant, suggesting that there is, as expected, no reverse causality.  
LSDVC standard errors in regression (A.1) to (A.4) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction 
initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
[29] 
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